Individuals more strongly affiliated to religion have on average more children than less religious ones. Here, based on census data of 3 658 650 women aged 46-60 years from 32 countries provided by IPUMS International and data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (n ¼ 2400 women, aged 53-57 years), we show that religious homogamy is also associated with higher reproduction in terms of a higher number of children and a lower chance of remaining childless. We argue that, together with the relationship between general religious intensity and number of children, religious homogamy has reproductive consequences. These may impact future demographic developments and could have also played a role in the biological evolution of humans.
Introduction
Evolutionary biology has been interested in religion-in the wider sense of 'a general set of beliefs about existence'-ever since Charles Darwin [1] . The interest of evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology in religion, religious behaviour, rites and rituals has even grown over the last few years (reviewed in [2] ). The central questions are how a cultural trait such as religion could persist over time, and whether reproduction ever was or still is higher in individuals carrying this trait. This would be expected if a process of selection were involved. If a cultural trait like religion increases reproduction, then this trait might act as a selective force, thereby shaping human evolution profoundly [3] . Accordingly, some religions are characterized by an increase in the number of adherents because of the sheer reproductive output of their members [4] . Impressive examples of the pro-fertile characteristics of religious affiliation are the Mormons, who outnumber the number of children of their contemporaries in the USA [5] . Moreover, numerous studies have shown, on an individual level, that more intensively affiliated persons (measured for instance by the frequency of attendance of religious services) have on average more children than the less affiliated [4, [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Correspondingly, Weeden et al. [13] argued based on US data that a central function of intense religious affiliation is to support a high-fertility, monogamous mating strategy. Religion, however, is not always associated with a higher number of children; extreme examples are the Shakers, who are married but live in celibacy [4] , as well as ancient sects occupied with self-castration [14] .
One reason for the pro-fertile effect of religious affiliation may be its impact on the use of contraceptives, as has been shown in Catholic US women [15] . Correspondingly, Krishnan [16] used Canadian data to show that non-Catholic wives in homogamous marriages who attend church services more often are less motivated to control fertility and are thus less frequently voluntarily childless. The effects of contraceptive use on fertility seem to be particularly important in developing countries. An example is Southern India, where 99% of Muslim and 81% of Hindu women suppose that their religion does not permit contraceptive use [17] . In line with this finding, Knodel et al. [18] report-for Thailand-higher fertility as a result of less likely contraceptive use among Muslim women.
Muslims have been reported to have more children than other religious groups [19] . By analysing data from 30 developing nations, Heaton [20] , for instance, found that Muslims have a higher average number of children than Christians, whereby the difference increases with economic development. This is probably in part because education plays a lesser role in reducing Muslim versus Christian reproduction. Also, Christians use contraceptives more than twice as frequently as Muslims in these 30 countries [20] . Accordingly, a recent analysis found a higher-than-average regional offspring number in Muslim women in all analysed regions and countries; the mean number of children in unaffiliated women was lower than average in almost all the analysed regions [21] . The authors further predict that, even though global fertility trends are expected to decrease until 2050, both Muslim and Christian reproduction will still remain above the global average and be substantially higher than values in unaffiliated persons [21] .
In order to persist over time, religion must-beyond its pro-fertile effect-also be transmitted as a cultural trait across generations. Transmission of religion, religious practice and religious intensity, including the fertility norms inherent in many religions, is assumed to occur via two types of socialization, which complement one another. The first type is within generations via oblique socialization by the community and cultural environment [22, 23] . The second type is across generations via direct socialization by parents [22, 24] . Here, two factors contribute to the intergenerational transmission of religion as a cultural trait: the preference of religious individuals for their children to have their own religious trait [25] as well as a potential genetic endowment for religion [26] . In this respect, children seem to be 'intuitive theists' [27] . Notably, direct socialization ability is enhanced in religiously homogamous versus heterogamous couples. This is partially because a heterogamous marriage signals that faith is less important [22] . Furthermore, religious homogamy increases the probability that the children are religious themselves [28, 29] .
Homogamous (¼assortative) mating means mating a partner more similar than expected by chance. Assortative mating is known to encompass a wide range of traits beyond religious homogamy, for instance ethnicity, age, education, physical as well as personality characteristics (e.g. [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] ). There is some evidence that homogamous mating enhances fertility (e.g. [36 -38] ). Lehrer [39] reported in a small US sample that Catholic and Mormon (but not Protestant) women in religious inter-marriages have a lower fertility. One reason for the pro-fertile effect of homogamy may be that in homogamous couples, marital stability and satisfaction are typically higher than that in heterogamous ones [36, [40] [41] [42] [43] , which especially holds true for spouses homogamous for religion [39, 44] .
The stabilizing effect on marriage in religiously homogamous couples may partly reflect the spouse's conformity concerning a traditional attitude towards the institution marriage and family, especially in spouses that attend religious events [45] [46] [47] . Accordingly, along with a more likely denial of contraception (see above), such attitudes towards marriage and family may enhance reproduction: in religiously homogamous couples that agree on these fertility rules, a higher number of children can be expected.
In addition, individuals adhering to the same religion believe each other to be generally more trustworthy. This may further stabilize marriages with predicted positive effects on the number and wellbeing of children. This trust in persons of the same religion helps explain the still high prevalence of religiously homogamous marriages in modern societies (in the subsequent text we use homogamy/homogamous exclusively in the sense of 'formal religious denomination') One presumed advantage of religion is that 'big gods' seemingly enforce moral behaviour and the adherence to community rules [14] , which are then monitored by a superficial instance [48] . In this regard, the question of Gretchen to Faust, 'How it is with thy religion, pray?' (Goethe 'Faust', from [49] ) to assess his loyalty makes sense: it points to her preference for a religious man-possibly of the same faith-who therefore is expected less likely to defect. Big gods may serve as watchful instances observing and potentially punishing deviating behavior, a feature, however, mainly of large and thus more anonymous societies [14] . In small scale societies, by contrast, 'big moralizing gods' are unusual, and gods are typically less concerned with human affairs and moral behaviour [50, 51] .
Even though some religions, e.g. Islam, strongly enforce religious homogamy, it is not limited to countries with an enacted state religion, but is also found in secular countries. US data, for instance, show a 66% prevalence of homogamous Catholic marriages in Tennessee, although Catholics represent only 4% of the population on that state. Another example is Illinois, exhibiting a 91% prevalence of homogamous Jewish couples with a population of less than 2% Jews [25] . Against this background, we investigate whether religious homogamy (i.e. homogamy according to the surveyed religious denomination) is associated with higher reproduction in terms of the number of children and the odds of remaining childless. We use both worldwide data, analysing census samples from around the globe, as well as one dataset from the USA for in-depth analysis.
Material and methods
We used two different datasets for our study: (i) census data from 32 countries from a broad range of world regions and (ii) a US dataset (Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS)).
(a) International census data
We used the census data from 32 countries provided by IPUMS International (encompassing 3 658 650 women aged between 46 and 60 years) to investigate the association between religious homogamy and reproductive outcome in terms of the women's number of children as well as childlessness. We used the most recent IPUMS International census dataset for each country, encompassing 1980 -2011 (for a detailed list of used censuses with number of cases see the electronic supplementary material, table S1). These 32 countries represent all countries for which IPUMS International provides information on the individual religious denomination (for a detailed list of religious denominations surveyed and their frequencies for each country see the electronic supplementary material, table S2a).
We encoded religious homogamy as 1 if both spouses have the same religious denomination (i.e. religiously homogamous) and 0 if both spouses have a different religious denomination (i.e. religiously heterogamous). We further included in the analyses the women's religious denomination (encoded as a categorial variable such as for instance 'Roman Catholic'), the women's highest education (encoded as 1 ¼ less than primary school completed, 2 ¼ primary completed, 3 ¼ secondary school completed and 4 ¼ university completed), the women's age in years at the time of the census survey, the area where the women live (encoded as 0 ¼ rural, 1 ¼ urban; provided by IPUMS International, noting that the definition of 'urban' varies significantly among countries; in some cases, the definition is rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 283: 20160294 based on a population threshold or other measurable criteria, in other cases the categorization is a consequence of administrative classification), the women's total number of biological children as well as the women's childlessness (encoded as 0 ¼ childless, 1 ¼ one or more biological children). Spouses at the time of the census were associated by IPUMS International.
We used SPSS 19 and R v. 3.1.1 for all analyses (general linear mixed models were calculated with the library MASS, function glmmPQL). We compared women's mean number of children between religiously homogamous and heterogamous couples, using the Mann -Whitney U-test, and compared the percentage of childless women in religiously homogamous versus heterogamous couples using x 2 -test. We further applied different general linear mixed models, each using religious homogamy, women's age, women's highest education, the area where the women live, as well as all two-way interactions with religious homogamy, the women's highest education, and the area where women live as fixed factors, and country and the women's profession of faith as random factors, regressing on (i) the women's number of children based on a Poisson error structure and (ii) women's childlessness based on a binomial error structure, respectively. To control for potential confounders, we further added to each of these GLMs one of the following variables as an additional random factor: (i) GDP per capita (in quartiles, calculated for each country and closest available census year; source: world bank: http://datacatalog.worldbank.org/; for availability, see the electronic supplementary material, table S3), (ii) gender gap index (in quartiles, calculated for each country and closest available census year; source: world economic forum; http://reports.weforum.org/global-gendergap-report-2014/rankings/; for availability, see the electronic supplementary material, table S3), (iii) human development index (in quartiles, calculated for each country and closest available census year; source: United Nations; http://hdr.undp.org/ en/data; for availability, see the electronic supplementary material, table S3) and (iv) GINI index (in quartiles, calculated for each country and closest available census year; source: world bank: http://datacatalog.worldbank.org/; for availability, see the electronic supplementary material, table S3). As these factors are inter-correlated, we calculated a separate model for each of these random factors.
In addition, to control for onset of reproduction and potential effects of educational homogamy, we calculated the same models but instead of an additional random factor such as GPD including educational homogamy-calculated as binary indicator on basis of the educational categories described above, i.e. encoded as 1 if both spouses have same educational attainment (i.e. educationally homogamous) and 0 if both spouses have different educational attainment (i.e. educationally heterogamous)-as well as age at first marriage as a proxy for reproductive onset. S2b ). We first included all one-way interactions between religious homogamy and the other variables, and then eliminated the non-significant variables step-wise. The significance level was set at p , 0.05.
(b) Wisconsin Longitudinal Study
No in-depth analyses are possible with the census data. We therefore additionally used the WLS to analyse the association between religious homogamy, women's number of children and their childlessness in greater detail.
The WLS is a long-term study of a random sample of 10 317 men and women who graduated from Wisconsin high schools in 1957, born in the years from 1937 -1940. We included only women (3146) who are married for the first time and who are still in this marriage at the time of the survey in 1993. We used the following variables from the WLS: women's education after high school (encoded as 1 ¼ less than 1 year of college, 2 ¼ 1 -3 years of college, 3 ¼ bachelor completed and 4 ¼ master or more completed), yearly income (wages before taxes) surveyed in 1993, religious denomination surveyed in 1993 (see the electronic supplementary material, table S4), religious intensity measured by the attendance at religious services (in the following sections labelled as 'religious attendance') surveyed in 1993 (for detailed categories, see the electronic supplementary material, table S5), religious homogamy surveyed in 1993 (encoded as 0 ¼ religiously heterogamous, 1 ¼ religious homogamous; spouses were associated by the WLS), age at marriage, number of biological children in 1993 and women's childlessness (encoded as 0 ¼ childless, 1 ¼ one or more biological children). In 1993, the youngest individuals (born 1940) were 53 years old. We therefore assumed that these women had completed reproduction by that time.
We calculated the following linear mixed models in R (library MASS, function glmmPQL): women's religious homogamy as well as their religious attendance, education, age at marriage and wages as fixed factors, and their religious denomination as a random factor, regressing on (i) number of a children based on a Poisson error structure and (ii) childlessness based on a binomial error structure. We first included all one-way interactions between religious homogamy and the other variables, and then eliminated the non-significant variables step-wise.
Results (a) International census data (i) Prevalence of religious homogamy
Religious homogamy is very common worldwide, ranging in our sample of 32 countries from 67.16% couples in Jamaica to 99.92% couples in Iran ( (ii) Reproductive outcomes of religious homogamy
In 17 of the 32 analysed countries, religiously homogamously married women have significantly more children than heterogamously married ones (table S7, electronic supplementary material). In six countries, the average number of children is higher in heterogamously married women but the difference is significant only in three countries (table S7, electronic supplementary material).
In all four GLMs regressing on women's number of children, homogamy and women's age are significantly positively associated, whereas increasing women's education and an urban residence are significantly negatively associated with her number of children (table 1: GLM with GDP per capita as additional random factor in addition to women's denomination; electronic supplementary material, table S8a-c: GLMs with either gender gap index, human development index and GINI-index, respectively, as an additional random factor). The significant positive interaction between homogamy and highest education indicates that the positive association between homogamy and number of children rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 283: 20160294 increases with increasing educational level. The interaction between an urban residence and homogamy is significantly negative, indicating a less positive effect of homogamy on the number of children in urban versus rural areas.
Results remain unchanged if age at marriage and educational homogamy are included in the analysis; age at marriage is significantly negatively and educational homogamy significantly positively associated with the number of children (electronic supplementary material, table S9a; note that this analysis was possible only with a limited number of different censuses).
In 13 of the 32 countries, the percentage of childless women is significantly lower in homogamous versus heterogamous couples (table S10, electronic supplementary material). Although the percentage of childlessness is higher in homogamous couples in 10 countries, this difference is not significant in any of these countries (table S10, electronic supplementary material; why religious homogamy does not exert a pro-fertile effect in some countries is discussed in the Discussion section). In all four GLMs regressing on women's childlessness, overall homogamy is significantly negatively associated with having at least one child, meaning that religiously homogamous couples overall have a higher chance of remaining childless. But at the same time, the interaction between homogamy and women's education is significantly positive, indicating that with increasing women's educational level, religiously homogamous couples become increasingly less likely to be childless compared with heterogamous couples (table 2: GLM with GDP per capita as an additional random factor in addition to women's profession of faith; electronic supplementary material, table S11a-c: GLMs with either gender gap index, human development index and GINI-index, respectively, as additional random factor). Also, in all four GLMs, women's age, education and living area are significantly negatively associated with having a least one child. Here, the significant negative interaction between living area and homogamy indicates that, for religiously homogamous couples, the chances of remaining childless are higher in urban compared with rural areas.
Again results remain unchanged if age at marriage, which is negatively, and educational homogamy, which is positively associated with having ever reproduced, are included in the analysis (electronic supplementary material, table S9b; note that this analysis was possible only with a limited number of different censuses).
(b) Wisconsin longitudinal study
The prevalence of religious homogamy in our subset of the Wisconsin data is 86.2%. About 90% of this subset is of Christian faith in the broad sense (the largest group being Roman Catholics with 43%). The largest non-Christian group is the atheists (7.5%). Women's average number of children increases with religious attendance, but in a nonlinear fashion ( figure 1) .
As in most of the international census datasets above, the Wisconsin data also show that religious homogamy is associated with a higher number of children (mean + s.e.) in homogamous versus heterogamous couples: 3.17 + 0.31 versus 2.81 + 0.77, Mann-Whitney U-test, U ¼ 369330, p , 0.0001) and a lower proportion of childlessness ( per cent childlessness in homogamous versus heterogamous couples: 2.1% versus 5.9%,
The total number of women being heterogamously married and also childless (22) , however, is very low. In the general linear mixed model regressing on number of children, religious homogamy and attendance at religious services are significantly positively, whereas the woman's age at marriage and her wages are significantly negatively associated with her number of children (table 3) . Table 1 . General linear mixed model of a woman's age, highest education, religious homogamy, living area and the interactions between religious homogamy and women's highest education, as well as religious homogamy and living area, with country and women's religious denomination, plus GDP per capita as random factors, regressing on the women's number of children, based on a Poisson error structure. In the general linear mixed model regressing on women's childlessness, only religious homogamy is significantly positively associated, whereas her age at marriage and whether she graduated at the master level or higher are significantly negatively associated with having at least one child (table 4).
Discussion
Religious homogamy is very common, averaging 94.82% of the couples in our sample from 32 countries. In countries with a state religion such as Iran, religious homogamy is presumably at least partially the result of law enforcement. But even in secular countries such as the USA, the prevalence of religious homogamy is high. This may be a result of socialization: according to [25] , parents have a strong preference for children who share their own beliefs and make costly decisions to influence their children's religious beliefs.
Usually but not universally, homogamy is positively associated with a woman's number of children and negatively with her odds to remain childless, both associations strengthening with increasing women's education. Although in most countries the percentage of childless couples is lower among religiously homogamous couples, in the multivariate model, homogamy is generally associated with a higher chance of childlessness. We interpret this finding as a sideeffect of the positive interaction between education and homogamy on childlessness. Accordingly, with increasing education, homogamy increasingly reduces the odds of childlessness. Importantly, more poorly educated individuals are the majority in the analysed countries so that, overall, homogamy is associated with a higher chance of childlessness. This view is supported by the Wisconsin dataset, which represents an educationally more uniform sample of at least high schooleducated individuals. This sample shows a positive effect of religious homogamy on the odds of having at least one child.
Our finding of an association between homogamy and reproduction agrees with Blume [52] , who showed that less religious individuals tend to have fewer children, and that the frequency of religious attendance is positively associated with individual reproduction [4, 52] . Yet, in line with Krishnan [16] , our data indicate that both matter, i.e. religious homogamy as well as religious intensity. The in-depth analysis of the Wisconsin dataset shows that both religious homogamy and the attendance of religious services are positively associated with number of children, and that homogamy but not religious intensity is associated with a lower chance of remaining childless. Thus, religious Table 2 . General linear mixed model of a woman's age, highest education, religious homogamy and the interaction between religious homogamy and women's highest education, with country, women's religious denomination plus GDP per capita as random factors, regressing on whether a women has ever reproduced (encoded as 0 ¼ childless, 1 ¼ one or more biological children), based on a binomial error structure. rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 283: 20160294 homogamy as well as religious attendance separately seem to foster reproduction. As is the case in the total sample, having a religiously homogamous spouse pays off in reproductive terms to a higher extent in rural than urban areas also in the Wisconsin sample. Note, however, that we lack data on religious attendance of spouses. Apart from religious homogamy, educational homogamy may also affect a couples' reproductive behaviour. Huber & Fieder [53] and van Bavel [54] , for example, report that in contemporary USA, educational homogamy significantly decreases childlessness, although no effect on the number of children was found. In addition, Mascie-Taylor [37] reported decreasing reproduction as educational homogamy decreases.
The significant interaction between religious homogamy and women's education we found in the census sample suggests that, in most countries, the association between religious homogamy and reproduction strengthens with increasing education. This finding is in line with reports from the USA on the relationship between education and attendance at religious services: the frequency of attendance at religious services was higher with increasing education [55] . The greater religious intensity in more highly educated individuals has been explained with their generally higher participation at social activities [55] . Thus, for more highly educated individuals it may be more important to stay within their social environment, where they receive more social support, which eventually affects reproduction.
In three countries, namely Brazil, Ghana and Malawi, we find a significant negative-and for Jamaica, Haiti and Nicaragua a non-significant negative-association between religious homogamy and mean number of children. Thus, as the examples of the platonically living Shakers, the Phrygian goddess Cybele members (practising ritualized public selfcastrations) as well as catholic priests living in celibacy show neither religious homogamy nor religiousness is necessarily associated with reproductive advantages. A detailed analysis (see the electronic supplementary material, table S12) reveals that in these six nations, the effect of homogamy on the number of children interacts differently with education and urbanization than in the other analysed countries. In the total sample, the interaction between education and religious homogamy is positive: with increasing education, homogamy is increasingly positively associated with the number of children. In this sub-group of countries (Brazil, Ghana, Malawi, Jamaica, Haiti and Nicaragua), however, the interaction between homogamy and education is positive only for university-educated individuals, but negative for primary and secondary school-educated individuals. This means that, except for university-educated women, with increasing education, religious homogamy is associated with fewer children. In addition, in the total sample, the interaction between religious homogamy and living in an urban area on number of children is negative. This means a higher pro-fertile effect of religious homogamy in rural areas. By contrast, this interaction is significantly positive in the sub-group of six countries. Overall, these results indicate that, as regards the number of children in these six countries, a pro-fertile effect of religious homogamy is found only in the minority of university-educated women as well as in the urban population. By contrast, in the majority of countries the pro-fertile effect of homogamy generally increases with increasing education and is higher in rural than urban areas. One potential explanation is that, in those six countries, religious borders are more 'blurred', particularly in the less educated and among the rural populations due to the influences from diverse religious sources. Brazil is a case in point [56] . According to this interpretation, the cultural trait 'religion' becomes more important only in the culturally more sophisticated social strata of those countries.
Our data show correlations but do not allow the inference of causalities. We can therefore only speculate about potential, mutually not exclusive, mechanisms that underlie the association between religious homogamy and reproduction. It is possible that in countries with a state religion, religiously heterogamous couples may suffer discrimination and oppression, which would hamper everyday life including the rearing of the children. The positive association with religious homogamy in such countries could also reflect differentials in the average number of children according to religious intensity because less religious individuals may marry more frequently outside their religious community. Also, an individual's strong preference for children may be associated with a higher effort to find a religiously homogamous spouse because this would make socialization easier. Finally, it is possible that individuals who married outside their religious community had searched longer before finding a spouse and therefore may have lost reproductive time. In the Wisconsin dataset, however, the positive effect of religious homogamy on the number of children and having ever reproduced remains significant even if age at first marriage is included in the model.
Likewise, in the IPUMS dataset that facilitates inclusion of age at marriage as well as educational homogamy in the analysis, all associations remain unaltered. The found negative interactions between religious homogamy and age at marriage and educational homogamy (electronic supplementary material, table S9a), respectively, point to a less positive effect of religious homogamy on the number of children in later marrying as well as educationally heterogamous couples.
Furthermore, as applies to homogamous mating in general, religiously homogamous couples may live in a more harmonious relationship than religiously heterogamous ones. In religiously homogamous more than in heterogamous couples, spouses may believe that they are meant for each other, which probably would decrease sexual competition and increase satisfaction within the couple. Accordingly, the higher reproduction of religiously homogamous couples could also be explained by the fact that such marriages are more satisfying [57] and stable [44, 45] . This, in turn, might both increase the number of intended children and facilitate their realization. This interpretation implies that religious homogamy generates a more positive environment for the wellbeing of the children [58, 59] , a lower risk of arguments on religion between spouses [60, 61] and a lower risk of dissatisfaction with religious education and socialization of the children [57] .
Importantly, most religions in some way regulate sexual relationships [58, 59] , including 'rules of cooperation' between spouses, which may also benefit the rearing of children. Homogamous couples also share the same religious rituals and probably argue less over core values and beliefs. This may likewise be advantageous in reproductive terms: their children will grow up with a congruent set of believes, ensuring the perpetuation of religious adherence over generations [58, 59] . Such religious rituals often act to deepen religious commitments [58, 59] and foster respect for the watchful deities, while rituals associated with marriage may act to deepen commitment for each other. Hence, religion may be important in stabilizing a marriage by the 'authority of god' in terms of 'What God joins together, man must not separate' (Mark 10 : 9). In addition, 'watched spouses' could be expected to be less likely to betray each other. Ultimately, the 'authority of god' may act to stabilize marriage for the sake of the children and to foster couple fertility.
How else might religion convey higher reproduction? As mentioned above, one possibility is that religion is advantageous in the context of cooperation. This is because religious commitment is costly and hard to fake [1, 60, 61] . This view is supported in [62, 63] , which show that religious kibbutzniks were engaged in more intra-group cooperation than secular kibbutzniks. Being religious might increase social status, help alliance building and facilitate social support, all of which expectedly would provide reproductive benefits [64] . Higher social status, for instance, is positively associated with the number of children in men [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] . In addition, again in men, a positive association between pro-social activities and number of children has been reported [70] . Finally, religious individuals might be generally less fearful of the future and thus simply be more willing to reproduce.
Whatever the proximate mechanisms, together with the relationship between general religiousness and number of children [4, 6, 7] , the association between religious attendance, religious homogamy and reproduction may eventually lead to a spread of alleles associated with religious feelings and behaviour, provided that a genetic association with 'religion' exists. Twin studies, however, have found a modest to moderate inherited influence on religiousness (0.00-0.5-reviewed in [71] ), whereas religious affiliation to a certain denomination seems to be a primarily culturally transmitted phenomena [72] . Even if religiousness is only weakly inherited, religiousness and religious homogamy may still have an effect on biological evolution: if the average number of children is higher in religious individuals as well as in religiously homogamous couples, then the frequency of alleles potentially associated with religiousness [73] would increase in a population. Although homogamy per se does not change allele frequencies [74] , but if rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 283: 20160294 there is an increase in the frequency of homozygotous individuals in a population, it does provide a basis on which selection may act (for instance via selection against the recessive homozygote) [74] . This may lead to a shift in allele frequencies in a population. Hence, as suggested in [3] , religion may be regarded as a cultural trait shaping human biological evolution.
From a demographic perspective, the reproductive consequences of religious homogamy may also be relevant: owing to the higher fertility rate of religiously affiliated women (worldwide 2.59 children per affiliated versus 1.65 children per unaffiliated women), the share of the un-affiliated in the world population will decrease from 16.4% in 2010 to 13.2% in 2050 [21] .
Our census-based study has some limitations because we do not know whether the women's children were born within the marriage (i.e. the current marriage of the respective census) used for the classification into homogamous and heterogamous couples.
